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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Although the facts of this case include details of 
money transfers and offshore asset protection trusts in sunny 
South Pacific locales, its ultimate resolution involves nothing 
more exotic than the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.  
We consider the Code’s provisions defining the property of a 
bankruptcy estate and determine what is required for a trustee 
to “recover” that property for the benefit of the estate, as 
provided in 11 U.S.C. § 550.  The property at issue here is $6 
million that was fraudulently transferred by Appellant 
Advanced Telecommunication Network (“ATN”) to two of 
its former owners, including Appellee Daniel W. Allen, Sr. 
(“Allen”), as part of a shareholder litigation settlement in 
1999.  ATN avoided that transfer and obtained a recovery 
order in its separate bankruptcy proceedings in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida 
(the “Florida Bankruptcy Court”).  Allen subsequently filed 
the present bankruptcy case in the District of New Jersey, and 
argues that the funds were never recovered and are therefore 
property of his estate subject to the Code’s automatic stay 
provision.  We conclude that the District Court applied too 
narrow a definition of “recover” and hold that where a debtor 
(like ATN) avoids a fraudulent transfer and obtains a 
recovery order, it has sufficiently “recovered” those funds 
such that they are a part of that debtor’s estate under the 
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Code.  Accordingly, we will reverse and remand this case to 
the District Court. 
I. 
 In 1989, Allen and Gary Carpenter (“Carpenter”) 
founded ATN, a company engaged in reselling long distance 
telephone service.  Allen and Carpenter each owned 50% of 
the voting stock in ATN, while Allen’s brother David Allen 
and Carpenter’s father Robert Carpenter owned the remaining 
non-voting stock.  Allen and Carpenter had a falling out in the 
spring of 1996, and Carpenter ultimately terminated Allen’s 
employment with ATN on August 14, 1996. 
A. The Allen-Carpenter shareholder litigation 
 Allen sued Carpenter and ATN in New Jersey state 
court in April 1996, asserting several claims pertaining to the 
management of ATN.  During trial, Daniel and David Allen 
(the “Allens”) and Carpenter (along with their respective 
attorneys) entered into a handwritten settlement agreement 
that relieved Carpenter of any liability to the Allens in 
exchange for, inter alia, a $1.25 million payment to the 
Allens’ attorneys, a $6.25 million payment to the Allens in 
two installments ($250,000 and $6 million), and a stipulation 
of dismissal with prejudice upon execution.  A formal written 
agreement outlining substantially the same terms was signed 
on January 12, 1999, and the $6 million transfer (at issue in 
the present case) was made on June 1, 1999.1 
                                              
1 In 1995, ATN also became involved in a contract 
dispute with a competitor, WATS/800, Inc.  We need not 
discuss that litigation at length, except to note that Carpenter 
relinquished control of ATN to two companies controlled by 
WATS president Damian Freeman as part of settling that 
case.  Freeman remains in control of ATN. 
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B. The ATN bankruptcy 
 On January 10, 2003, ATN filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in the Florida Bankruptcy Court.  ATN 
also filed an adversary proceeding against the Allens on April 
28, 2003, seeking, inter alia, to avoid the $6 million transfer 
pursuant to §§ 544 and 5502 of the Bankruptcy Code, as well 
as the New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the 
“New Jersey UFTA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-20 et seq.  The 
adversary complaint alleged that the $6 million payment to 
the Allens on June 1, 1999, was fraudulent insofar as ATN 
did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange.   
After commencing the adversary proceeding in the 
Florida Bankruptcy Court, ATN sought a preliminary 
injunction to freeze the funds at issue.  The Allens moved for 
a continuance, which the court granted.  In the interim, the 
Allens took the following actions:  “Daniel Allen transferred 
the the [sic] Assets under his control to a Cook Islands self-
settled asset protection trust known as the Shingle Oak 
Family Trust . . . and . . . David Allen . . . transferred 
approximately $150,000 to a Cook Islands self settled [sic] 
asset protection trust known as the Southern Breeze Trust.”  
App. at 124.  The Florida Bankruptcy Court found that, as a 
result of these actions, “[g]ood cause exists to believe that 
                                              
2 Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee 
to “avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . 
. . that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding 
an unsecured claim . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).  Section 
550 provides:  “to the extent that a transfer is avoided under 
section 544 . . . the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the 
estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the 
value of such property, from . . . the initial transferee of such 
transfer.”  11 U.S.C. § 550(a).   
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Defendants acted in bad faith in twice requesting a 
continuance of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing,” thus 
allowing them time to transfer the money to the Cook Islands 
trusts.  App. at 129.  The court granted preliminary injunctive 
relief and ordered that the funds be repatriated.  When the 
Allens failed to comply with the court order, the Florida 
Bankruptcy Court twice held Daniel Allen in contempt of 
court. 
 When the case proceeded to trial, the Allens prevailed.  
The Florida Bankruptcy Court found that ATN’s claim was 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that its 
fraudulent transfer claims failed on the merits under the New 
Jersey UFTA.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed.  Advanced Telecomm. Network, Inc. v. Allen (In re 
Advanced Telecomm. Network, Inc.), 490 F.3d 1325 (11th 
Cir. 2007).  The Eleventh Circuit held that ATN had proved a 
fraudulent transfer under the New Jersey UFTA insofar as:  
(1) it was insolvent at the time of the $6 million transfer; and 
(2) it received no reasonably equivalent value for the transfer.  
Id. at 1332-38.  On remand, the Florida Bankruptcy Court 
avoided the transfers to the Allens and entered a $6 million 
judgment on January 15, 2010, in favor of ATN on its 
fraudulent transfer claims. ATN then sought to collect on its 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
7069.  In response, the Florida Bankruptcy Court entered an 
order directing Daniel Allen: “(i) to repatriate all monies 
currently held in his Shingle Oak Trust to counsel for ATN 
within 30 days of the entry of [the] order, (ii) to provide an 
accounting of all monies deposited in and transferred from the 
Shingle Oak Trust within 60 days of the entry of [the] order, 
and (iii) to otherwise immediately freeze any other use or 
transfer of any monies in the Shingle Oak Trust.”  App. at 
208.  When Allen failed to comply with the second 
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repatriation order, ATN brought a motion to hold Allen in 
contempt on August 30, 2011.  No action was taken on that 
motion because on September 21, 2011, Allen filed a Chapter 
7 bankruptcy petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”). 
C. Proceedings in the present case 
 ATN filed the instant adversary proceeding in the 
Bankruptcy Court shortly after Allen filed his Chapter 7 
petition.  ATN sought an order “determining that the 
ATN/Allen Litigation [in the Florida Bankruptcy Court] was 
not stayed pursuant to [Allen’s] bankruptcy filing because 
ATN was seeking to collect its own estate assets and not 
those of [Allen];” or, in the alternative, “granting ATN relief 
from the automatic stay to continue with the ATN/Allen 
Litigation and collection of the Judgment and waiving the 14 
day stay of effectiveness of order.”  App. at 288.  ATN 
maintains that the funds at issue should not be subject to the 
automatic stay3 in Allen’s bankruptcy case pursuant to § 
                                              
3 The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code provide that: 
 
[A] petition filed under section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . 
operates as a stay, applicable to 
all entities, of— 
 
8 
362(d) of the Code, which allows a court to grant relief from 
the stay “for cause.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
                                                                                                     
(1) the commencement or 
continuation, including the 
issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, 
administrative, or other 
action or proceeding 
against the debtor that was 
or could have been 
commenced before the 
commencement of the case 
under this title, or to 
recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case 
under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, 
against the debtor or 
against property of the 
estate, of a judgment 
obtained before the 
commencement of the case 
under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain 
possession of property of 
the estate or of property 
from the estate or to 
exercise control over 
property of the estate . . .  
 
11 U.S.C. § 362. 
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Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court denied 
ATN’s motions by concluding that: (1) any property in the 
Cook Islands trusts was not property of ATN’s bankruptcy 
estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541,4 but was instead property 
of Allen’s estate and thus subject to the automatic stay upon 
Allen’s bankruptcy filing; and (2) the funds were not held by 
Allen in constructive trust for the benefit of ATN under New 
Jersey law.  As is relevant here, the Bankruptcy Court 
concluded that the funds did not fit within the Bankruptcy 
Code’s definition of “property of the estate” because ATN—
despite having avoided the transfer—did not actually recover 
tangible possession of the funds under § 550.  Absent actual 
tangible recovery, Allen had a superior interest in the funds, 
which were thus the property of his estate (not ATN’s) and 
subject to the automatic stay.  The Bankruptcy Court entered 
its opinion on March 2, 2012, and ATN appealed. 
 On July 19, 2013, the District Court affirmed for 
essentially the same reasons.  It also rejected ATN’s 
argument that the New Jersey Bankruptcy and District Courts 
(the “New Jersey Federal Courts”) lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the adversary proceeding.  ATN filed a timely notice of 
appeal to this Court on August 19, 2013.  On October 11, 
2013, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order discharging 
Allen’s debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727.  
 
                                              
4 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in 
relevant part, that “[t]he commencement of a case under 
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.  Such 
estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever 
located and by whomever held: . . . (3) Any interest in 
property that the trustee recovers under section . . . 550 . . . of 
this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
below pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  “Our review of 
the District Court’s decision effectively amounts to review of 
the bankruptcy court’s opinion in the first instance.”  In re 
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Because this issue involves interpretation of the Bankruptcy 
Code, it is a question of law subject to plenary review.  Id. 
III. 
 We address two issues in this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether the New Jersey Federal Courts had subject 
matter jurisdiction over ATN’s adversary proceeding.  
Second, we consider whether the $6 million payment was a 
part of ATN’s bankruptcy estate in Florida such that it was 
not affected by the automatic stay provisions triggered by 
Allen’s bankruptcy proceedings in the present case.  We 
consider each issue below. 
A. Subject matter jurisdiction 
ATN argues that the New Jersey Federal Courts lacked 
jurisdiction under the doctrine set forth in Princess Lida of 
Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), on the 
ground that the New Jersey Federal Courts’ decisions could 
conflict with the Florida courts’ disposition of the funds in the 
offshore trust.  The District Court concluded that it had 
jurisdiction because the judgment in the Florida case was in 
personam, and therefore the New Jersey Federal Courts were 
not required to exercise control over property already under 
the control of the Florida courts.  We agree.  “We exercise 
plenary review in determining whether the district court was 
vested with subject matter jurisdiction.”  Brown v. Francis, 
75 F.3d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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 The Princess Lida doctrine “prevents a court in which 
an action is filed from exercising jurisdiction when a court in 
a previously filed action is exercising control over the 
property at issue and the second court must exercise control 
over the same property in order to grant the relief sought.”  
Dailey v. Nat’l Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 
1993).  As discussed by the Supreme Court: 
. . . [T]he principle applicable to 
both federal and state courts that 
the court first assuming 
jurisdiction over property may 
maintain and exercise that 
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the 
other, is not restricted to cases 
where property has been actually 
seized . . . but applies as well 
where suits are brought to marshal 
assets, administer trusts, or 
liquidate estates, and in suits of a 
similar nature where, to give 
effect to its jurisdiction, the court 
must control the property. 
 
Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466.  The Princess Lida doctrine 
“applies when: (1) the litigation in both the first and second 
fora are in rem or quasi in rem in nature, and (2) the relief 
sought requires that the second court exercise control over the 
property in dispute and such property is already under the 
control of the first court.”  Dailey, 987 F.2d at 176 (citing 
Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466).  Because the test is 
elucidated in the conjunctive, we need only discuss the first 
element to reject ATN’s jurisdictional argument. 
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 The crux of the jurisdictional question in this case is 
whether the Florida Bankruptcy Court exercised in rem 
jurisdiction over the trust funds or in personam jurisdiction 
over Allen.  Although “[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, 
is in rem,” Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 
U.S. 356, 362 (2006), “[t]he Framers would have understood 
that laws on the subject of [b]ankruptcies included laws 
providing, in certain limited respects, for more than simple 
adjudications of rights in the res,” id. at 370 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Historically, this additional 
judicial authority included the power to imprison third parties 
who possessed the bankruptcy estate’s assets and the power to 
grant in personam writs of habeas corpus ordering the release 
of individuals from debtors’ prison.  Id. at 370-71.  Apropos 
of the present case, the Katz Court also recognized that “the 
trustee, in order to marshal the entirety of the debtor’s estate, 
will need to recover the subject of the transfer pursuant to § 
550(a).  A court order mandating turnover of the property, 
although ancillary to and in furtherance of the court’s in rem 
jurisdiction, might itself involve in personam process.”  Id. at 
371-72.  Thus the Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
the bankruptcy proceedings themselves (which are in rem) 
and ancillary orders entered in the course of those 
proceedings—including those pursuant to § 550—which may 
be in personam. 
 In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 
(1992), the Supreme Court addressed a postpetition transfer 
of property that had been avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
549(a), recovered pursuant to § 550(a), and reduced to a 
monetary judgment.  Id. at 31.  In dictum, the Court rejected 
an argument based upon in rem jurisdiction:  “As an initial 
matter, the premise for [the argument based upon in rem 
jurisdiction] is missing here, since respondent did not invoke, 
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and the Bankruptcy Court did not purport to exercise, in rem 
jurisdiction.  Respondent sought to recover a sum of money, 
not ‘particular dollars,’ . . . so there was no res to which the 
court’s in rem jurisdiction could have attached.”  Id. at 38 
(citations omitted). 
 The statements in Katz and Nordic Village demonstrate 
that the judgment rendered by the Florida Bankruptcy Court 
was not directed at particular property.  Cf. Black’s Law 
Dictionary 700 (8th ed. 2005) (defining “judgment in rem” as 
“[a] judgment that determines the status or condition of 
property and that operates directly on the property itself.” 
(emphasis added)).  The Florida Bankruptcy Court explicitly 
entered the judgment at issue here against individuals by 
stating that “[j]udgment is entered . . . against the defendants, 
Daniel W. Allen and David D. Allen . . . in the amount of 
$6,000,000.”  App. 194.  This order, which granted relief 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 544 (avoidance) and 
550 (recovery),5 falls into that area identified in Katz—a 
court’s ancillary power to utilize “in personam process” in 
order to effectuate its in rem bankruptcy jurisdiction.  Katz, 
546 U.S. at 372.  Like in Nordic Village, the recovery order 
was aimed at recovering “a sum of money, not ‘particular 
dollars,’” therefore taking the order outside the Florida 
Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction.  See 503 U.S. at 38. 
                                              
5 While the judgment order did not explicitly refer to 
those two sections, it granted relief on “Counts 2 and 6 
asserted in the Amended Complaint.”  App. at 194.  Both of 
those counts explicitly sought relief pursuant to Code sections 
544 and 550.   
 
14 
 ATN argues that the repatriation order exercised in 
rem jurisdiction over the trust funds in particular.6  This 
argument disregards the underlying judgment, however, and 
looks solely to an ancillary order entered in aid of execution.  
The repatriation order was entered pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Bankruptcy Procedure 7069, which applies Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 69 to adversary proceedings.  Fed. R. Bankr. 
P. 7069.  Rule 69 in turn provides the procedure for executing 
on a judgment by way of proceedings ancillary to the court’s 
primary basis for jurisdiction.  See IFC Interconsult, AG v. 
Safeguard Int’l Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 
2006) (noting that a garnishment action pursuant to Rule 69 
fell under a court’s ancillary jurisdiction).  Thus, the 
repatriation orders were ancillary to the exercise of the court’s 
in personam jurisdiction, not an exercise of new in rem or 
quasi in rem jurisdiction.  The Florida Bankruptcy Court 
judgment was, therefore, an in personam judgment against 
Allen, not the funds themselves.  Absent a showing that both 
the Florida Bankruptcy Court and the New Jersey Federal 
Courts exercised such control, ATN fails to meet the first 
prong of the Princess Lida test.  We thus conclude that we 
have jurisdiction to consider the merits of ATN’s appeal.   
B. Property of the estate 
 The New Jersey Federal Courts found that the 
fraudulently transferred funds were not property of ATN’s 
bankruptcy estate in the Florida litigation under § 541 
                                              
6 It is unclear what ATN hopes to gain by challenging 
the New Jersey Federal Courts’ jurisdiction, because a 
successful challenge would presumably leave it with limited 
means to collect on its judgment.  Because we conclude that 
jurisdiction exists, however, we need not delve further into 
ATN’s choice of strategy at this time. 
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because they were never “recovered” by ATN pursuant to § 
550.  We reject this analysis because it failed to address the 
central issue in this case—what it means to “recover” 
property (or the value of such property) for the benefit of the 
estate.  With respect to that issue, the New Jersey Federal 
Courts applied too restrictive a definition of “recover”—a 
definition that required ATN to recover actual tangible 
possession of the funds before considering them part of its 
estate.  That definition does not comport with the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code, as we discuss below.   
 1. Circuit split 
 The New Jersey Federal Courts identified a split 
between the Fifth Circuit and the Second and Tenth Circuits 
in addressing whether “recovery” of funds is required before 
they can be considered property of a bankruptcy estate.  
Compare Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica 
Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th 
Cir. 1983), with FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 
980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992), and Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 
1031 (10th Cir. 2013).  The courts in both MortgageAmerica 
and Colonial Realty interpreted § 541(a)(1), which defines 
property of the estate as all property, “wherever located and 
by whomever held,” including “all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).   
 MortgageAmerica addressed whether property 
fraudulently transferred by a debtor remains the property of 
the debtor’s estate under § 541(a)(1) even though that 
property remains in the hands of third parties.  714 F.2d at 
1275.  The Fifth Circuit held that it does, noting that 
“[p]roperty fraudulently conveyed and recoverable under the 
Texas Fraudulent Transfers Act remains, despite the 
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purported transfer, property of the estate within the meaning 
of section . . . 541(a)(1) of the new Code.”  Id. at 1277.  The 
court noted that the debtor in such situations retains a “‘legal 
or equitable interest[]’” in the fraudulently transferred 
property.  Id. at 1275 (citing 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 
70.14[1] (14th ed. 1978)).  Importantly, the court focused on 
the broad language in § 541(a)(1), and declined to decide 
“whether the phrase ‘[a]ny interest in property that the trustee 
recovers’ may be read ‘might recover’ at some time in the 
future.”  MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1273 n.7.   
The Second Circuit in Colonial Realty disagreed and 
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s reading of § 541(a)(1) in 
MortgageAmerica essentially rendered § 541(a)(3) 
meaningless.  Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131.  The Colonial 
Realty court noted: 
“If property that has been 
fraudulently transferred is 
included in the § 541(a)(1) 
definition of property of the 
estate, then § 541(a)(3) is 
rendered meaningless with respect 
to property recovered pursuant to 
fraudulent transfer actions.” . . . 
Further, “the inclusion of property 
recovered by the trustee pursuant 
to his avoidance powers in a 
separate definitional subparagraph 
clearly reflects the congressional 
intent that such property is not to 
be considered property of the 
estate until it is recovered.” 
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Id. (quoting In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. 1989)).  In a more recent decision addressing the split 
between the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the Second Circuit’s holding in Colonial 
Realty was correct, because otherwise “a mere allegation [of a 
fraudulent transfer] without any showing of merit” could 
bring property into the estate.  Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 
1031, 1038 (10th Cir. 2013).  The New Jersey Federal Courts 
in this case also agreed with the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Colonial Realty and concluded that, absent actual recovery of 
the fraudulently transferred funds, those funds are not 
considered “property of the estate” under § 541. 
 2. Recovering the fraudulently transferred funds 
 The problem that arises from the New Jersey Federal 
Courts’ reliance on Colonial Realty is that neither the Second, 
Fifth, nor Tenth Circuit decisions addressed the crucial 
question in this case—what it means to “recover” 
fraudulently transferred property for purposes of § 541(a)(3).  
Instead, the courts in Colonial Realty, MortgageAmerica, and 
Rajala looked to whether funds remained property of the 
debtor’s estate under § 541(a)(1) absent the recovery 
provision in § 541(a)(3).  Because this case involves a 
recovery insofar as the Florida Bankruptcy Court entered a 
recovery order pursuant to § 550, the rationale set forth by the 
Second Circuit and adopted by the New Jersey Bankruptcy 
Court is not helpful.  This is particularly true here where the 
only impediment to actual tangible recovery was Allen’s own 
conduct. 
 Rather than simply interpreting the plain language of § 
541(a)(3), the Bankruptcy Court introduced the phrase 
“actually recovered” to ostensibly require actual tangible 
possession of the fraudulently transferred funds before they 
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could be considered a part of ATN’s estate.  The New Jersey 
Federal Courts identified no decision, however, that includes 
such language, and in fact many of the decisions they cited 
specified that no recovery action had been taken at all.7  We 
reject the New Jersey Federal Courts’ strained interpretation 
of § 541(a)(3) for two reasons:  first, the facts of this case 
support a finding that ATN did, in fact, recover the funds at 
issue; and second, the New Jersey Federal Courts’ 
interpretation would render § 541 internally inconsistent. 
 First, with respect to whether the funds were 
recovered, ATN has, in a legal sense, recovered the funds for 
its estate by securing a § 550 recovery order.  The Eleventh 
                                              
7 See, e.g., Murrietta v. Fehrs (In re Fehrs), 391 B.R. 
53, 71 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (acknowledging that “[t]his is 
not a case where Trustee avoided a transfer and established a 
§ 550 recovery . . .”); Moyer v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc. 
(In re Feringa), 376 B.R. 614, 625 n.10 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2007) (noting that “it is difficult to read Section 541(a)(1) so 
broadly as to include potential recoveries of fraudulent 
conveyances, especially in light of subparagraph[] (a)(3) . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Wagner v. Christiana Bank & Trust Co. 
(In re Wagner), 353 B.R. 106, 112-13 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2006) (where a Chapter 7 trustee took no action to avoid an 
allegedly fraudulent transfer, the court noted that “for a claim 
to become ‘property of the estate’ a trustee must actually 
exercise her avoiding powers and make a tangible recovery of 
the property before it can be transformed into ‘property of the 
estate’ as envisioned by Section 541(a)(3)”); Grossman v. 
Murray (In re Murray), 214 B.R. 271, 279 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1997) (finding the reasoning in Saunders to be “particularly 
compelling where, as here, no affirmative action had been 
taken to recover the funds at the relevant time”). 
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Circuit and the Florida Bankruptcy Court on remand both 
concluded that the transfer at issue here was fraudulent under 
the New Jersey UFTA.8  The Florida Bankruptcy Court then 
entered a judgment in favor of ATN and granted recovery 
relief pursuant to § 550.  All that now stands between ATN 
and actual possession of the funds is Allen’s dilatory conduct.  
Contrary to the holdings below, none of the decisions cited by 
the New Jersey Federal Courts required a debtor to recover 
actual tangible possession of the funds at issue in order to 
make those funds part of the debtor’s estate under § 
541(a)(3).  We will not impose such a high hurdle, 
particularly where doing so would allow Allen to continue 
avoiding the judgment against him. 
  Second, the New Jersey Federal Courts’ 
interpretation of “recovers” renders § 541 internally 
inconsistent.  Subsection (a) provides that the estate includes 
property “wherever located and by whomever held.”  11 
U.S.C. § 541(a).  If “recovers” is interpreted as requiring 
actual possession, it would render the “wherever located and 
by whomever held” language superfluous, since actual 
                                              
8 We note that the New Jersey Federal Courts did not 
appear to doubt that a fraudulent transfer took place.  See 
App. at 11 (District Court noted:  “Here, while the Florida 
Court found the transfer of money in 1999 was an avoidable 
fraudulent transfer and issued a recovery order pursuant to § 
550 . . .”); App. at 302 (Bankruptcy Court noted: “While it is 
true that the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Florida, on remand, found that the transfers were avoidable 
under both New Jersey Statutes 25:2-25(b)(2) and 25:2-27(a) 
. . .”).  Because the fraudulent transfer issue was fully 
litigated in the Florida courts and is not challenged on appeal, 
we defer to the Florida courts’ determination on that issue.   
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possession would mean that no one but the trustee could ever 
possess estate property.  Courts should avoid interpretations 
of statutory language that render other portions of the statute 
superfluous.  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 
(3d Cir. 2001).  We therefore reject the New Jersey Federal 
Courts’ interpretation because it would render subsection (a) 
and subsection (a)(3) inconsistent—an untenable result. 
 In reaching our conclusion, we also reject two 
arguments Allen raises for the first time in his pro se brief.  
First, he argues that ATN’s appeal was rendered moot by the 
Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a bankruptcy discharge order in 
this case on October 11, 2013.  Second, he argues that he has 
satisfied “both items that were at issue with the Florida 
Bankruptcy Court that were the subject of contempt 
proceedings.” Appellee’s Br. at 4.  Neither argument is yet 
ripe for our review. 
 The discharge order does not render ATN’s claims 
moot at this point.  Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides for a discharge under certain circumstances, but it 
also provides a window of opportunity for creditors, among 
others, to request a revocation of such discharge within one 
year of the order (under certain circumstances) or before the 
close of the case (in others).  11 U.S.C. § 727(e).9  Thus, to 
                                              
9 Section 727(e) provides in full:  
 
The trustee, a creditor, or the United States 
trustee may request a revocation of a 
discharge— 
(1) under subsection (d)(1) of this section 
within one year after such discharge is 
granted; or 
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the extent that ATN could seek to revoke Allen’s discharge at 
least before October 11, 2014, the discharge itself does not 
render ATN’s arguments moot. 
 With respect to Allen’s argument that he has satisfied 
“both items that were at issue with the Florida Bankruptcy 
Court,” and that “Judge Burns would not have granted a 
Discharge had Appellee not performed [the two items 
referenced above] fully, completely and to her satisfaction,” 
the New Jersey Federal Courts were never given an 
opportunity to pass on them.  Appellee’s Br. at 4.  Moreover, 
the Bankruptcy Court’s discharge order provides no basis for 
the court’s decision, and makes no reference to any 
requirements having been satisfied.  See Order Discharging 
Debtor, Case No. 11-37671, Docket Entry No. 109 at 1 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (providing only that “[i]t 
appearing that the debtor is entitled to a discharge . . . The 
debtor is granted a discharge under section 727 of title 11, 
United States Code.”).  Because remand is necessary in this 
case, Allen may seek to develop a further factual record and 
make those arguments at that time, but we will not consider 
his arguments for the first time on this appeal. 
 In light of these considerations, we conclude that the 
New Jersey Federal Courts erred in interpreting “recover” as 
requiring actual possession of the funds at issue.  By contrast, 
ATN obtained a § 550 recovery order, thus bringing the funds 
within its estate in the Florida proceedings.  The mere fact 
                                                                                                     
(2) under subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3) of 
this section before the later of— 
 (A) one year after the granting of  
  such discharge; and  
 (B) the date the case is closed. 
  11 U.S.C. § 727(e). 
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that Allen’s dilatory conduct has foiled ATN’s past attempts 
to recover actual possession of the funds does not preclude a 
finding that the funds are properly part of ATN’s estate and, 
accordingly, not subject to the automatic stay.  Because we 
find it necessary to reverse and remand on this ground, we 
need not address ATN’s alternative argument that Allen holds 
the funds in constructive trust under New Jersey law.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the 
judgment of the District Court and REMAND for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
